Fixing the Central Parity and the Evolution of the Currency within the Exchange Rate Mechanism II in the Countries that Joined the Euro Zone by ANGHEL, Lucian et al.
Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy
ISSN: 2286-2668 © College of Management (NUPSPA) & Tritonic Books 
Volume 2 (2014) no. 1, pp. 21-40; www.managementdynamics.ro
Fixing the Central Parity and the Evolution of the Currency  
within the Exchange Rate Mechanism II  
in the Countries that Joined the Euro Zone
Lucian Claudiu ANGHEL
College of Management
National University of Political Studies and Public Administration




National University of Political Studies and Public Administration




National University of Political Studies and Public Administration




National University of Political Studies and Public Administration
6 Povernei St., Sector 1, 010643, Bucharest, Romania
laurentiu.treapat@facultateademanagement.ro
Abstract. "e present paper presents the models used by the countries that joined the Euro 
zone a#er 2000, in $xing the central parity and the evolution of the local currency towards 
Euro, when participating in Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). It synthesizes the main 
theories for determining the equilibrium exchange rate. It also presents the modality of put-
ting them into practice in the countries that had already become members of the Euro zone. 
"e better we know the other countries’ experience in the respect of the joining process to the 
Euro zone, the better will Romania be able to prepare itself for adopting the unique European 
currency. "us, we will be synthesize the main approaches within literature and also in the 
economic policy deciders’ practice concerning the estimation of the equilibrium exchange rate 
and implicitly, of the central parity. "e paper presents the modality of $xing the central par-
ity and the experience of participating in ERM II for a number of member states that joined 
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the Euro zone a#er 2000: Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus and Estonia. For these 
states we also analyze the evolution of the currency towards Euro while participating in ERM 
II. Starting from these examples, we explain the advantages and the disadvantages in $xing 
the central parity over/at/under the value of the exchange rate on the market at the moment 
of joining ERM II and we underline the problems that might occur in the case of choosing a 
central parity that is not compatible with the equilibrium value of the exchange rate.
Keywords: equilibrium exchange rate, exchange rates mechanism II, purchasing power par-
ity, uncovered interest rate parity, behavioral equilibrium exchange rate, uncovered interest 
rate parity
Methodology, models and methods of estimation.  
The definition of the equilibrium rate
As we brie!y present further on, the used methodology and the models of 
estimation can be grouped in three big categories: 1. models that suppose the 
lack of arbitration opportunities on the consumers’ goods market or on the 
"nancial market – the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), the Uncovered Interest 
Rate Parity (UIRP); 2. models that imply both the internal equilibrium and 
also the lack of arbitration opportunities – out of which, the model for "xing 
the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) provides a !exible frame 
for incorporating other interfacing models such as Balassa-Samuelson, the 
monetary model and the Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (PEER); and 
3. models that involve the internal and external equilibrium – out of which the 
model for "xing the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) also of-
fers a !exible frame for incorporating other models with similar speci"cations 
such as Desirable Equilibrium Exchange Rate (DEER), Natural Real Exchange 
Rates (NATREX), Sustainable Real Exchange Rate (SRER). In addition, we 
outline which of them were used in practice for "xing the equilibrium ex-
change rate by the economic policy deciders of the EU member states and by 
the international "nancial entities.
#e used models can be grouped in three categories (Anghel, Ciurilă & Bojes-
teanu, 2012) depending of the hypotheses they start from:
 – models that require the lack of arbitration opportunities on the con-
sumers’ goods market or on the "nancial market – the Purchasing Pow-
er Parity (PPP), respectively, the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP);
 – models that require both the internal equilibrium and the lack of arbi-
tration opportunities – out of which the model of "xing the Behavioral 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) o%ers a !exible frame for cover-
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ing other interfacing models such as Balassa Samuelson, the monetary 
model and Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (PEER);
 – models that require the internal and external equilibrium – out of 
which the model of "xing the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
(FEER), also o%er a !exible frame for incorporating other models with 
similar speci"cations such as Desirable Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
(DEER), Natural Real Exchange Rates (NATREX), Sustainable Real Ex-
change Rate (SRER).
From the time frame point of view, in which the equilibrium is accomplished, 
the models can be grouped in three categories:
 – models that aim the short term exchange rate equilibrium – for ex-
ample, UIP;
 – models that aim the midterm exchange rate equilibrium – BEER, 
PEER;
 – models that aim the long term exchange rate equilibrium – the mon-
etary model, PPP, FEER, DEER, NATREX, SRER. For this "eld, Aggar-
wal (2013) tried to solve the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity in the For-
eign Exchange Market puzzle, bringing his contribution in clarifying 
the speci"c terminology and the way the models are put into practice. 
#e Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER – see Williamson, 1994) is 
de"ned as the exchange rate level for which an economy is in equilibrium, both 
at internal and external level). #e internal equilibrium is de"ned as the state 
of economy in which there exists a de"cit or an excess of demand, hence the 
GDP is at potential and the in!ation rate is constant (or equal with the in!ation 
target for the economy taken into discussion). In what the external equilibrium 
concerns, its de"nition is subject to intense discussions. In large, the external 
equilibrium is reached when the weight in GDP of the current account bal-
ance reaches a target value with certain desirable features. While some authors 
consider this target value as the level of the current account compatible with the 
stabilization of the weight of the external debt stock in GDP or as the level of 
the net external assets weight in GDP, other consider that that level of current 
account de"cit is obtained when the economic policies (mainly the "scal policy, 
as the monetary policy cannot in!uence the economy on long term) are sustain-
able on long term. #is variant of the FEER model is named DEER (Desired 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate), namely that exchange rate compatible with reach-
ing a desired value, a current account target. Within the same approach, mod-
els such as NATREX (Natural Equilibrium Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic 
Balance (Isard et al., 2001; Isard, 2007; Lee et al., 2008) were also developed.
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The comparative evaluation of the methodology used in various EU states. Models 
used by member states and other entities in charge with quantifying the equilibrium 
exchange rate
In practice, the economic policy deciders and the international "nancial enti-
ties use several resembling methods for establishing the equilibrium value of 
the exchange rate (Anghel, Ciurila & Bojesteanu, 2012). #e Central Banks 
of the states that joined the Euro zone estimated the equilibrium value of the 
exchange rate for the national currencies even in the previous stage, prior to 
joining ERM II, but, also while participating in ERM II, prior to joining to 
Euro zone, for evaluating the sustainability of the central parity, respectively, 
of the value for which the national currency will be "xed towards Euro.
#e following table brie!y presents what resembling methods for establishing 
the equilibrium value of the exchange the Central Banks we presented in this 
paper, used.
Table 1. Methods for establish the equilibrium value of the exchange rate
Central Banks  Used Model or Methodology 
 Central Bank of Malta PPP;BEER; Maeso Fernandez et al. (2004) model
Central Bank of Cyprus FEER model
Central Bank of Estonia BEER model
Central Bank of Czech Republic BEER and FEER models
Central Bank of Slovenia FEER model
Central Bank of Latvia BEER and FEER modelsNATREX and SVAR methods
In the following part, we describe in detail the methodology used for estab-
lishing the equilibrium value of the exchange rate, as applied by the presented 
Central Banks.
#e central Bank of Malta (2006) estimates the equilibrium exchange rate us-
ing the PPP methodology, the BEER methodology and also a methodology 
proposed by Maeso Fernandez et al. (2004). #e BEER model is used for es-
timating the real exchange rate, e%ectively built by using the Consumption 
Price Index. #e trigger factors that are considered are: the report between 
the non-saleable goods prices and the saleable goods prices (approximated by 
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the report between the Consumption Price Index and the Production Price 
Index), the weight of the net external assets in GDP, the terms of trade – ap-
proximated by the report between the exports de!ator and the imports de!a-
tor) and the di%erential of the real interest rates. #e model uses the co-inte-
gration Engle-Granger, not the co-integration Johansen, due to the reduced 
series of used annual data. #e model proposed by Maeso Fernandez et al. 
(2004) explains the rate gap – de"ned as a di%erence between the e%ectively 
accomplished value and the nominal exchange rate as assumed by the PPP 
model – by using a series of determining factors: the GDP on inhabitant, the 
commercial openness degree and the weight of the governmental expenses 
within GDP. #e model is estimated by using the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) on 
panel data, the series also including Malta and #e EU 15 Countries. 
#e Central Bank of Cyprus used the following three terms of the methodolo-
gy, as described within section 5.4. (Kyriacou & Papageourghiu, 2010), as eval-
uation models for the FEER equilibrium rate. #e real exports and imports are 
separately modeled on components of goods and services: the goods exports 
are determined by the global trade and by the real exchange rate, the export of 
services are determined by the global income and the real exchange rate, while 
the goods and services imports are determined by the internal income and the 
real exchange rate. #e necessary de!ators for calculating the balance of the 
current account are considered equal to a weighted average of the goods prices, 
of the internal prices and of the global export prices. #e balance of the equi-
librium current account is determined by using estimations on panel data. #e 
data series correspond to the main Cyprus’s commercial partners, including, as 
explanatory variables for the current account de"cit, the dependency rate, the 
GDP on inhabitant and the cyclically adjusted budget de"cit. 
#e Central Bank of Estonia evaluated the equilibrium value of the national 
currency by using the BEER methodology (Hinosaar et al., 2005). #e fun-
damental variables considered by the authors were: the relative productivity 
di%erential, the net external assets as weight in GDP, the balance of the cur-
rent account as weight in GDP, the governmental consumption as weight in 
GDP, the exchange rate, the external interest rate approximated by Euribor. 
Eventually, in the respect of the evolution of the real exchange rate - the rela-
tive productivity di%erential, the external net assets as weight in GDP and the 
exchange rate were signi"cant for statistics reasons.
#e Central Bank of Czech Republic uses the BEER and FEER models for the 
quarterly evaluation of the equilibrium rate, this being an input in the DSGE 
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projection model (Adam, 2012). #e BEER model estimates a co-integration 
relation between the real exchange rate, built using the Production Prices In-
dex and the explanatory variables: the productivity di%erential towards the Euro 
zone, the weight of the external net assets in GDP, the weight of the real invest-
ments in GDP, the weight of the net export in GDP. #e FEER model is built 
on the traditional models’ structure, including equations for the real exports 
and imports, while the potential GDP is estimated using the production func-
tion methodology. In addition, the Central Bank of #e Czech Republic runs a 
project for building a SRER model (engl. Sustainable Real Exchange Rate). #is 
is a version of the FEER model, that determines the current account norm while 
having a target for the weight of the external debt within GDP, and estimates the 
equations based on panel data, by using the data of the New Member States plus 
a control group formed by Spain, Portugal and Greece (Babecky et al., 2010).
#e Central Bank of Slovenia performed analyses regarding the real apprecia-
tion of the national currency and the equilibrium value of the exchange rate. 
As apotential explanatory factor for the trend of real appreciation recorded 
by the Slovenian Tolar, the e%ect Balassa Samuelson was evaluated to a re-
duced value, but with an ascending trend for the last part of the analyzed 
time interval (Zumer, 2002). #e equilibrium values of the exchange rates 
for the foreign currencies were evaluated within a FEER model (Genorio & 
Kozarmenik, 2004). Following the spirit of the traditional FEER models, the 
authors build a model for the variables that de"ne the weight of current ac-
count balance within GDP. #e volume of exports is explained by the evolu-
tion of the real (exchange) rate based on the industrial production prices, by 
the imports volume for the Slovenia’s eight main commercial partners and by 
the exchange rate. #e volume of imports is also explained by the evolution of 
the real exchange rate based on the industrial production prices, the real GDP 
adjusted with the Slovenia’s degree of commercial exposure and the exchange 
rate. #e export and import prices and the GDP de!ator are not modeled, 
their achieved value was used instead. For the current account norm, namely 
the equilibrium value on a long term, four di%erent scenarios were selected: 
a) zero (on a long term, the current account balance is in equilibrium); b) the 
Hodrick-Prescott trend, by the achieved value of the current account balance; 
c) a current balance trend that allows to an economy to borrow, within the "rst 
years of the transaction (the maximum current account de"cit is of 3% out of 
the total GDP), a&er that, the current account balance tends, step by step, to 
zero; d) #e current account de"cit decreased, step by step, to zero, within 
the "rst years of the transactions and a&erwards, remains equal with zero. 
Based on the estimated FEER model, the equilibrium value for the Slovenian 
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Tolar exchange rate towards the Euro and respectively towards the German 
Mark until 1999, is determined, under the four hypotheses of current account 
norm. Also, the authors extend the equilibrium rate estimations until 2011.
#e most recent adhesion to the Euro zone, starting with January 1, 2014 be-
longed to Latvia. According to the studies performed by #e Central Bank of 
Latvia (Ajevskis et al., 2012) the result was that this central bank used the FEER 
and BEER models for estimating the real equilibrium exchange rate towards 
Euro. In addition, they used other two methods, NATREX and SVAR (struc-
tural vector auto regression). In the NATREX case - the real exchange rate that 
equates the current account balance consistent with full employment to the dif-
ference between desired savings and investment. Behavioral equations of con-
sumption, investment and trade balance are derived by optimizing economic 
agents' decisions. It is thus supposed to be a structurally sound model of equi-
librium real exchange rate estimation. #e SVAR methodology aims at decom-
posing real exchange rate into permanent and transition components by iden-
tifying the supply, demand and nominal shocks using a long-run identi"cation 
scheme, and then assessing the equilibrium exchange rate by assuming that 
only the supply (or supply and demand) shock a%ects REER in the long run. 
#e International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2010) uses in the evaluation of the 
competitive environment for the analyzed countries, Romania including, 
three methodologies: a) the real equilibrium exchange rate, b) the macroeco-
nomic balance approach, and c) the external sustainability. 
#e method a) is similar to the BEER methodology and requires the estima-
tion of an equilibrium relation between the real exchange rate and a set of 
basic variables: the exchange rate, the relative productivity, the relative gov-
ernmental consumption, the net external assets, the capital inputs for aids and 
remittances. #e real exchange rate is determined based on the equation esti-
mated by using the values at equilibrium on midterm, for the basic variables.
#e method b) is similar to FEER methodology. #e current account norm is de-
termined based on an equation estimated between the current account balance 
and a set of basic values: the relative income, the relative increase of the income, 
the relative dependence rate, the relative increase of the population, the relative 
"scal balance, the energetic power balance sheet, the initial external net assets, 
the capital transfers and inputs for aids. #e necessary adjustment for the real ex-
change rate represents the necessary modi"cation for equalizing the current ac-
count norm with the basic balance of the current account (the one that would be 
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registered at the internal and external equilibrium) and is determined by using 
the estimated semi-elasticity of the current account balance at the real exchange 
rate. For Romania, IMF (2012) estimates a semi-elasticity of -0,14, namely an 
increase of the real exchange rate with 1% would lead to a decrease of the current 
account de"cit with 0,14%.#e method c) is similar with the macroeconomic 
equilibrium method (method b), just that the current account norm is deter-
mined as that value of the current account balance that leads to the stabilization 
of the weight of the net external assets within the GDP at a certain targeted value. 
Salto and Turini (2010) from the European Commission evaluate the di%erent 
methodologies of measuring the equilibrium exchange rate for the EU mem-
ber states. #ey reach to the conclusion that the approaches based on FEER 
type models (namely the current account norms) o%er compatible results with 
the approaches based on relative prices (BEER and PPP). #e BEER method-
ology makes the empiric estimations by using the co-integration technique 
based on panel data, the estimation method being DOLS Dynamic Ordinary 
Least Squares. #e explanatory variables taken into consideration for the real 
exchange rate are the weight of the net external assets in GDP, the relative 
prices di%erential (saleable/non-saleable goods), the weight of the non-gov-
ernmental consumption in GDP. #e obtained results are extremely impor-
tant for the EU member states. For the countries within EU zone, a trend of 
over-evaluation was detected for the national currencies, a&er the adhesion to 
the unique currency. In what the new member states concerns, their curren-
cies were also over-evaluated, but, starting with the international "nancial and 
economic crisis debut, they su%ered signi"cant adjustments. #at, in some 
cases, led even to under-evaluation for the national currencies.
#us, we can notice that, the great majority of the Central Banks and the in-
ternational "nancial entities use, as a common denominator, the BEER and 
FEER methodologies for "xing the exchange rate on long term for the local 
currency towards Euro. #us, "xing the central parity in Romania as well, at 
the moment of participation in ERM II should be done at least based on these 
two families of econometric models.
Fixing the central parity and the evolution within the exchange rates mechanism II
A mandatory preparatory stage within the adhesion process to Euro zone is 
represented by the participation in the Exchange Rates Mechanism II (ERM 
II). ERM II represents a framework for running the exchange rate regime 
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within the Member States that haven’t adopted the Euro yet, but intend to do 
it into the near future and represents a preliminary condition for adhering to 
the Euro zone, as ruled by #e Treaty of Maastricht (Anghel, Ciurilă & Bojest-
eanu, 2012). #e participation within this mechanism is made based on a par-
ity/central exchange rate "xed by negotiations between ECB, the ministries of 
"nance and the national banks within the Euro zone and the ones participat-
ing in ERM II, with the advice from the European Commission (ECOFIN). 
As a de"nition, the parity/the central exchange rate represents the reference 
value of the national currency towards Euro, as "xed when the participation 
in ERM II begins and, towards which the !uctuation interval of the exchange 
rate on the market is calculated, and also, implicitly, the intervention values.
#e Exchange Rate on the Market when entering in ERM II can be di%erent 
from the reference value. In principle, the exchange rate on the market all 
along the participation in ERM II period, evolves freely within a !uctuation 
interval of ± 15% towards the central parity, but it is also possible to "x some 
shorter time intervals, based on bilateral agreements between #e Central 
Bank of the candidate state and ECB. Reaching, by the currency rate, of the su-
perior or inferior limit within the !uctuation interval, automatically draws the 
common intervention of ECB and of #e Central Bank of the candidate state. 
#e European treaties1 stipulate the modality of intervention on the market in 
case of reaching the !uctuation limits. 
#e central parity can be modi"ed along the participation in ERM II. Read-
justing up the value of the national currency does not have any impact upon 
ful"lling the criteria from Maastricht. On the other hand, the devaluation of 
the national currency is considered as a non-ful"llment of the Maastricht cri-
teria regarding the currency rate stability for a period of at least two years 
within ERM II. In this case, the period of participation in ERM II is automati-
cally extended and the candidate state must postpone adopting the Euro for 
at least two more years.
#e central parity is tightly connected with the equilibrium level of the ex-
change rate. #is, because the equilibrium exchange rate is compatible with 
the accomplishment of the internal and external equilibrium of an economy, 
and the accomplishment of these equilibriums represents a premise for the 
long term stability in any country. Yet, "xing the central parity close to the 
1  Please, see the UE Agreement on 16 March 2006 – 2006/C 73/08 with its amend-
ment in 2008.
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equilibrium value of the exchange rate is problematical, mainly because this 
equilibrium value may !uctuate in time, especially in the countries that are in 
the process of nominal and real convergence. Having in view that, during the 
participation in ERM II, the candidate states for the Euro zone will continue 
their process of nominal and real adjustment, most probably with e%ects upon 
the equilibrium exchange rate and upon the exchange rate on the market, it is 
possible that the central exchange rate to be "xed when entering the ERM II at 
a level that is incompatible with the equilibrium value of the exchange rate on 
a long term. Another problem related to "xing the central parity around the 
equilibrium value is that, the di%erent types of estimation models and methods 
for the equilibrium exchange rate may lead to substantially di%erent results.
#e parity exchange rate towards Euro, which the candidate state used when 
adhered to the Monetary Union was determined when entering ERM II and 
can be modi"ed by regaining the value and devaluating, all along the partici-
pation period in ERM II. #e exchange rate of the national currency towards 
Euro, at the moment of entering the Monetary Union may di%er from the cen-
tral parity until the ending of the participation in ERM II. Still, there exists a 
big probability that, the central parity, as "xed when entering the ERM II, to be 
identical or very close to the conversion rate of the national currency to Euro. 
In conclusion, when entering ERM II, a candidate state can choose from the 
following available strategies (please, see also the document of the Central 
Bank of Slovenia, 2003):
 – "xing a central parity higher than the exchange rate registered on 
the market when entering the ERM II – this strategy was adopted by 
Greece. It is recommended when estimating that the national currency 
is substantially over-evaluated at the moment of joining ERM II.
 
#e main advantage of this strategy is that it o%ers a higher !exibility to the 
monetary policy, along the participation in ERM II. In case there exists a mis-
match with the ECB interest rate, the monetary policy interest rate within the 
candidate state may be gradually reduced, the eventual depreciation of the na-
tional currency not necessarily attracting a resetting of the central parity up-
wards and, implicitly, a prolongation with two more years of the participation 
in ERM II. In addition, if the over-evaluation of the national currency estimat-
ed by the deciders of economic policy is correct, the triggers of the currency 
rate will action in the sense of the depreciation of the national currency. In this 
case, "xing the central parity at a higher value than the rate on the market al-
Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy | 31
Volume 2 (2014) no. 1, pp. 21-40; www.managementdynamics.ro
lows the national currency to depreciate, without consequences upon ful"lling 
the criterion from Maastricht regarding the stability of the exchange rate. #e 
main disadvantage is that, by pointing out an over-evaluation of the national 
currency when entering in ERM II, the in!ation expectations may increase and 
may contribute to an increase of the in!ation rate, with a negative e%ect upon 
the nominal convergence criterion concerning the stability of prices.
Greece chose, when entering in ERM II in July 1998, to "x a central parity 
at 353,109 Drahma/Euro, with approximately 13% over the level registered 
by the market rate in February 1998. As it can be seen in the "gure no.1. an 
immediate consequence was the depreciation of the national currency with 
12.3% when entering in ERM II. Yet, in the following period of time, as the 
result of the increase of the investors’ trust in the evolution of the economy, 
the rate signi"cantly decreased. #e appreciation of the Greek currency and 
then, placing it for a long period of time on a trend that is signi"cantly under 
the central parity towards Euro, caused the decision to reduce the reference 
value of the Drahma towards Euro in January 2000. We can also observe that, 
when Greece entered the Euro zone, the currency on the market converged 
towards the central parity.
 
Figure 1. The evolution of the exchange rate for the Greek Drahma towards Euro,  
along the participation in ERM II. Source: Eurostat, Anghel et al. (2012)
 – "xing a central parity equal with the value of the foreign rate registered 
on the market when entering in ERM II – this strategy was adopted by 
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Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus and Estonia. Although they adopted 
the same strategy, the evolution of the exchange rates of these countries 
in ERM II was somehow di%erent. 
#is strategy is recommended when it is estimated that the national currency 
is close to the equilibrium value in the adhesion moment to ERM II.
#e main advantage of this strategy is that it does not impose immediate pres-
sures upon the currency rate on the market. In the probable conditions when 
this rate remains relatively constant a&er entering ERM II, the exchange rate 
may become an in!ationary anchor. #e main disadvantage is the fact that the 
monetary policy loses its !exibility in some respects, the modi"cations related 
to the monetary policy interest rate being able to generate appreciations and 
depreciations of the national currency, that move the exchange rate on the 
market away from the central parity. In addition, if being under the impact of 
the determinant triggers, the currency rate on the market when entering the 
ERM II is proven to be a lot under or over the value of equilibrium, the central 
parity will have to be reconsidered. In the case of devaluation, the candidate 
country will have to extend its participation in ERM II for two more years.
#ree of the countries that adopted this strategy registered constant evolu-
tions of the currency rate in ERM II, indicating the fact that, from the per-
spective of the determinant factors for the exchange currency, this is around 
the equilibrium value on midterm.
Figure 2. The evolution of the exchange rate for the Slovenian Tolar towards Euro,  
along the participation in ERM II. Source: Eurostat, Anghel et al. (2012).
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As it can be observed within the "gures no. 2, 3 and 4, the national currencies 
of Slovenia, Malta and Estonia remained very close to the central parity. For 
Estonia’s case, the currency remained "xed at the reference value as estab-
lished when entering ERM II, due to a monetary council that operates within 
this economy.
Figure 3. The evolution of the exchange rate for the Maltese Lira towards Euro,  
along the participation in ERM II. Source: Eurostat, Anghel et al. (2012)
Figure 4. The evolution of the exchange rate for the Estonian Kroon towards Euro,  
along the participation in ERM II. Source: Eurostat, Anghel et al. (2012).
Estonia was the "rst Baltic country that accepted to adhere to the Euro zone. 
One of the real convergence criteria was the GDP per inhabitant (standard 
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PPP) that had the highest level among the Baltic countries. In 2011, this indi-
cator represented approximately 67% from the UE28 average, while Letonia, 
in 2014 when it eventually joined, registered around 62% from the UE28 av-
erage, a&er a constant increase of 4 consecutive years for this ratio. Romania 
is still under the level of 50% out of the average GDP per inhabitant at UE28 
level, fact that suggests we still need time to prepare our economy prior to 
adopt euro (Anghel, 2014).
In what Letonia’s adhesion concerns, starting with the 1st of January 2014, for 
the Euro zone, , this country entered ERM II on 2nd of May, 2005, with the 
“Lats” pegged to the euro at 1 EUR = 0.702804 LVL (see Bank of Latvia site, 
2014). In ERM II, rate moves within the standard ±15% !uctuation margins 
around the central rate are allowed. However, Latvia made a unilateral com-
mitment to ensure a band of ±1% thus maintaining the existing !uctuation 
band that was accepted by the "nancial market. As a result, the graphic in-
dicating the LVL evolution towards Euro would have been identical with the 
one in the previous "gure 4 for Estonia’s case, the only di%erence being the 
"xed exchange rate towards Euro mentioned before. It is noticed that Latvia 
was maintained in ERM II for a period of time longer than 8 years, the mini-
mum period being of just 2 years. 
#e evolution of the Slovakian Kroon and of the Cyprus Pound was di%erent 
from the evolution of the other currencies previously presented. #e Slova-
kian Kroon was subject to some signi"cant appreciation pressures right in the 
moment of entering ERM II, result of the input of some substantial capital 
!ows ("gure 5.) into a small and open economy as Slovakia’s. For maintaining 
the market exchange rate close to the reference value, the central parity was 
decreased twice. Eventually, Slovakia joined the Euro zone having a rate with 
approximately 22% more appreciated towards the reference value as "xed 
when entering ERM II. 
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Figure 5. The evolution of the exchange rate for the Slovakian Kroon towards Euro,  
along the participation in ERM II. Source: Eurostat, Anghel et al. (2012)
#e national currency of Cyprus was also subject to some appreciation pres-
sures, immediately a&er joining ERM II ("gure 6). Apart from the Slovakia’s 
case, the pressures were not so strong; yet, the Cyprus Pound exchange rate 
on the market was situated under the reference value in ERM II until joining 
the Euro zone. 
Figure 6. The evolution of the exchange rate for the Cyprus Pound towards Euro,  
along the participation in ERM II. Source: Eurostat, Anghel et al. (2012)
 – "xing a central parity lower than the exchange rate registered on the 
market when entering ERM II. #is strategy is recommended just when 
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it is estimated that the national currency is seriously sub evaluated and, 
for the moment, it was not applied by any other candidate state to the 
Euro zone. 
Conclusions
Numerous models for "xing the central parity exist. #e families of models 
BEER and FEER are among the most frequently used models by the coun-
tries that adhered to the Euro zone starting with 2000, and probably should 
be also used by Romania within its process of adopting the unique European 
currency. Fixing the central parity as correct as possible is vital for the future 
of a country that will bond itself through a "xed conversion rate between the 
local currency and Euro. Fixing the conversion rate, the way it was presented 
in this paper, may be di%erent towards the exchange rate on the market when 
entering ERM II. #e exchange rate on the market all along the participation 
in ERM II freely evolves within a !uctuation interval of ± 15% towards the 
central parity. Reaching, by the currency rate, of the upper of lower limit of 
the !uctuation interval, automatically attracts the common intervention of 
the ECB and of the Central Bank of the candidate state.
#e central parity can be modi"ed during the participation in ERM II. #e re-
valorization of the national currency has no impact upon ful"lling the Maas-
tricht criterion. On the other hand, the devaluation of the national currency is 
considered to be a non-ful"llment of the Maastricht criterion concerning the 
stability of the currency rate for a period of at least two years within ERM II. 
In this case, the period of participating in ERM II is automatically extended 
and the candidate state must postpone adopting the Euro for at least two more 
years. All the countries that joined the Euro zone succeeded in avoiding such 
a situation. #e impact upon their image would have been devastating. #e 
economic repercussions would be very important if the period of remaining 
in the ante-room of the Euro zone were extended for two more years, namely, 
the participation in ERM II was almost started from zero.
 
Greece represents the exception among the countries that "xed a central 
parity over the exchange rate registered on the market, because the national 
currency was substantially over evaluated when Greece joined ERM II. Yet, 
Greece reduced the reference value of the Greek Drahma within ERM II to-
wards the initial level when entering ERM II. Now, we are able to analyze if 
Greece’s decision at that time was an inspired one. #is exception comes to 
Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy | 37
Volume 2 (2014) no. 1, pp. 21-40; www.managementdynamics.ro
strengthen the rule according to which "xing a central parity is equal with the 
value of the currency rate registered on the market when entering ERM II. 
#is strategy was adopted by Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and 
Latvia. Although they adopted the same strategy, the evolution of the cur-
rency rate for these countries in ERM II was somehow di%erent.
 
We can notice that this general rule is possible to be made use of when the 
countries are ready to adhere to the Euro zone, both from the point of view of 
ful"lling the nominal requirements but especially, from the point of view of 
ful"lling the real ones. #is is the reason why it is important no state to force 
the adhesion to the Euro zone prior to the moment it is ready to do it. #e eco-
nomical consequences are major when "xing the exchange rate towards Euro 
for an undetermined period of time and when giving up on a leverage of re-
balancing the economic lacks of balance, by eliminating the currency policy 
led by the local Central Bank. #is conclusion is valid also for the process of 
adhesion to the Euro zone that Romania will be able to achieve at the time its 
economy is prepared for.
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